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Abstract
Philosophical debates about the metaphysics of time typically revolve around two
contrasting views of time. On the A-theory, time is something that itself undergoes
change, as captured by the idea of the passage of time; on the B-theory, all there is to
time is events standing in before/after or simultaneity relations to each other, and these
temporal relations are unchanging. Philosophers typically regard the A-theory as being
supported by our experience of time, and they take it that the B-theory clashes with how
we experience time and therefore faces the burden of having to explain away that clash.
In this paper, we investigate empirically whether these intuitions about the experience
of time are shared by the general public. We asked directly for people’s subjective
reports of their experience of time—in particular, whether they believe themselves to
have a phenomenology as of time’s passing—and we probed their understanding of
what time’s passage in fact is. We find that a majority of participants do share the
aforementioned intuitions, but interestingly a minority do not.
Keywords Temporal passage · Temporal experience · Time · Metaphysics · Intuitions
1 Introduction
On one influential view of the metaphysics of time, time is seen as a dimension of
reality alongside the three spatial dimensions. This view of time recognizes a temporal
order amongst events—certain events happen before or after other events—but it says
that all there is to time is events being arranged in this order. Following terminology
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introduced by McTaggart (1908), this view of the nature of time is often called the
B-theory.
According to the rival A-theory, there is more to time than events being ordered
along a dimension, or indeed the idea of time as a dimension is fundamentally mistaken.
Crucial to the A-theory, as we will understand that theory in the context of this paper,
is the idea that time is itself something that undergoes change, indeed it constantly
does so, as expressed by the idea of the passage of time.1
Apart from metaphysical questions about the nature of time, the debate between A-
theorists and B-theorists also raises questions about philosophical methodology—what
should count as evidence for metaphysical claims. For instance, a common motiva-
tion among theorists defending a B-theoretic view of time is the idea that physics
should guide how we approach questions regarding the metaphysics of time (see, e.g.,
Callender 2017; Smart 2008), and that modern physics—in particular General Rela-
tivity—is incompatible with the picture of time sketched by the A-theory. Conversely,
A-theorists are often motivated by the idea that the B-theory cannot do justice to the
way time appears to us in experience (see, e.g., Craig 2000; Norton 2010).
Our focus in what follows will be on this latter argument from experience for the A-
theory.2 Whilst there are other lines of argument that A-theorists can and do pursue,3
our interest is in the argument from experience because, until recently, the idea that
“experience favours the A-theory”, as Prosser (2016, p. 41) puts it, has rarely been
challenged. Indeed, it is easy to find emphatic statements of that claim. According
to Schlesinger, “[t]here is hardly any experience that seems more persistently, or
immediately given to us than the relentless flow of time” (Schlesinger 1991, p. 427).
In a similar fashion, Savitt writes: “It seems manifest in our experience that time
flows—from the past, to the present moment, and into the future” (Savitt 1996, p. 348).
And Norton claims: “Time really passes … Our sense of passage is our largely passive
experience of a fact about the way time truly is, objectively” (2010, p. 24).4
The claim here is that there is an ingredient in the phenomenology of one’s ongoing
experience that is apparently metaphysically loaded, in so far as it suggests that time
is as the A-theory has it, rather than as the B-theory has it. Thus understood, the claim
is also often endorsed by B-theorists, only with the proviso that the phenomenology
1 There are A-theorists who don’t believe that time passes. For example, Tallant (2015) outlines a position
on which there is in an important sense a privileged present—he takes himself to be offering an A-theory of
time—but on which time does not pass (because there is no ‘time’ to do the passing). Also see Merricks’s
(2007, esp. pp. 124–125) account of presentism. In what follows we focus on those A-theories on which
time is said to pass.
2 See Skow (2011) and Baron et al. (2015) for overviews of how theorists have presented arguments from
experience in favour of the A-theory.
3 For instance, authors such as Markosian (2004), Maudlin (2002, esp. p. 237), and Zimmerman (2008,
esp. p. 221) argue for the A-theory on the grounds that it provides the best articulation of our common-
sense commitments about time, without appealing specifically to considerations about experience. (This is
something that we intend to probe in future research.) Another strand of arguments in favour of the A-theory
focuses specifically on differences in our emotional attitudes toward the past and the future (Prior 1959;
Pearson 2018).
4 Also see the claims of Eddington (1928, pp. 89–97), Schuster (1986, p. 695), and Williams (1951, p. 466).
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of experience is illusory in this respect. Miller et al. (2020) speak of this stance as that
of the ‘phenomenal illusionist’.5
However, as Miller et al. (2020) point out, there is also a separate strand of B-
theorists, whom they call ‘cognitive error theorists’.6 According to the cognitive error
theorist, the phenomenology of experience, properly characterized, is neutral between
the A-theory and the B-theory of time – it is just what one would expect experience to
be like if the B-theory was true. Yet, people mistakenly think that there is something
about the phenomenology of experience that suggests that time is as the A-theory has
it.
Both Miller et al.’s phenomenal illusionist and their cognitive error theorist are
putting forward philosophical views of the phenomenology of people’s experience
of time. But such views might not accurately represent how people themselves think
of their experiences—indeed, in the case of the cognitive error theorist the claim is
precisely that people are in error about what their experience is like. Thus Miller
et al.’s distinctions between different types of theorist already presuppose a certain
assumption about people’s everyday view of their own experience of time.
The same can be said for proponents of the original ‘argument from experience’. We
are familiar from other areas of philosophy with the worry that certain ‘intuitions’ that
philosophers take as premises in their reasoning might have in fact been formed under
the influence of their own theory and may not be shared by the general public (see,
e.g., Nadelhoffer and Nahmias 2007, p. 125; Knobe and Nichols 2008, p. 9).7 This
might also be the case with the idea that there is something of potential metaphysical
import to the phenomenology of experience.
In this paper, we describe a study intended to investigate to what extent people’s
everyday picture of their own experience of time is in line with the idea that there is
an ‘argument from experience’ for the A-theory, focusing in particular on the idea that
time passes. In order to demonstrate that people’s beliefs about their own experience
of time is in line with such an argument from experience, two conditions have to be
fulfilled: First, people have to agree that they do experience time passing; secondly,
when asked what they mean by time passing, they have to describe the idea of the
passage of time in recognizably A-theoretic ways, rather than giving a description that
is compatible with the truth of the B-theory.8
5 Torrengo’s (2017) phenomenal modifier view, on which a dynamic element is projected onto reality in
experience, is plausibly best understood as one variant of this line of response. Prosser (2012& 2016)
can also be read as offering a phenomenal illusionist proposal. He argues that change is experienced as
A-theoretic because the objects of experience are (mis)represented as enduring as opposed to perduring.
Also see Callender (2008).
6 Recent support for the view can be read in Balcells (2019), Baron et al. (2015), Braddon-Mitchell (2013),
Deng (2013a, b, 2018, 2019), Hoerl (2014), Miller et al. (2020), and Miller (2019).
7 This worry predates the rise in interest in experimental philosophy. For example Austin, an advocate of
‘ordinary language’ philosophy, warned against the appeal to ordinary language and intuitions in the case of
time. He says that theorists’ intuitions and ordinary language will often be “too much trodden into bogs or
tracks by traditional philosophy” and “will often have become infected with the jargon of extinct theories,
and our own prejudices too, as the upholders or imbibers of theoretical views” (Austin 1956, p. 8).
8 Note that these two conditions are required in order to show that people’s picture of their experience of
time is in line with there being an argument from experience to support the A-theory. However, the A-theorist
may have independent reasons to think that experience does support the A-theory even though people will
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There are very few empirical studies that directly address how members of the
general public understand what it means to say that time passes, and whether or not
they do describe themselves as experiencing time as passing. An exception is the
study of Latham et al. (2019), who were interested in whether dynamical theories
of time—on which time flows or passes—more closely resemble people’s ordinary
view of time than non-dynamical theories—on which time does not flow or pass.
Latham et al. presented participants with six different models of time—in the form
of vignettes describing a universe—each representing a contemporary philosophical
model of time (three dynamical, three non-dynamical). Participants were asked which
universe—described in the vignettes—is most like our own. Across two experiments,
Latham et al. demonstrated that the majority (~ 70%) of people’s views of time appear
to be dynamical, but a substantial minority (~ 30%) appear to hold a view of time as
non-dynamical.
It is important to note our distinct focus in the current paper. We are primarily
concerned with people’s everyday view of their own experience of time; in this context
we ask participants whether they believe that they experience time passing and their
understanding of what it means to say that time passes. (The former issue is also
probed by Latham et al. (forthcoming), whose findings are discussed in relation to our
own in §2.3.) With regard to participants’ understanding of what it means to say that
time passes, we asked participants to select between four different possible meanings,
two of which were recognizably A-theoretic and two of which were compatible with
the truth of the B-theory (see method for details). By asking participants both whether
they experienced time as passing, and what they take to be meant by saying that time
passes, our study was designed to allow us to categorize participants into one of four
groupings as shown in the table below (Table 1).
If a majority of participants were to respond as ‘passage-experiencers’, this would
mean that people generally describe their experiences in a way that implies that the
nature of those experiences, if veridical, would provide evidence for the truth of the
A-theory. Note, though, that if a majority of participants fell into the category we call
‘change-experiencers’ this would not, conversely, be a convincing demonstration that
people generally take the world as (apparently) presented to them in experience to be
as the B-theorist has it.9 This is because the descriptions of what it means for time to
pass that are not distinctively A-theoretic could nevertheless be endorsed by someone
who possessed an A-theorist metaphysics (e.g., an A-theorist could unproblematically
agree that ‘different things happen at different times’). The reverse is not true, or at least
not straightforwardly true, of the descriptions that were A-theoretic in nature (e.g., a
B-theorist could not easily agree that ‘things move from the future to the present to the
past’). Because of this, our study is best viewed as one regarding whether people’s own
descriptions of the nature of their experiences is in line with the idea that there is an
argument from experience for the A-theory; we are not addressing whether people’s
Footnote 8 continued
not typically characterise their experience in A-theoretic ways, perhaps given independent reasons to think
that one needs to be suitably placed to articulate the phenomenology. This is not something that we sought
to confirm or disconfirm.
9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the journal for pushing us to be clearer on this point.
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Table 1 Summary of how participants were categorized
Category Agree that they experience time
passing
Endorse a description of what it
means to say that time passes that is
distinctively A-theoretic
Passage-experiencers Yes Yes
Passage-non-experiencers No Yes
Change-experiencers Yes No
Change-non-experiencers No No
description of their experiences might actually suggest that there is argument from
experience for the B-theory.
The A-theorist using the argument from experience would predict that the general
public are typically passage-experiencers. This is also, plausibly, what the phenome-
nal illusionist would predict, with the proviso that the experience of time passing is
illusory. Depending on where the cognitive error theorist locates the source of sub-
jects’ error, she might share this prediction—if the error is said to arise because people
independently believe that time passes, and (presumably given some further, perhaps
implicit, assumptions) come to believe that whatever they experience includes time
passing.10 Or the cognitive error theorist may predict that the general public are change-
experiencers; that they do generally agree that they experience time passing, but give
descriptions of what they mean by time passing that are not metaphysically loaded
in a distinctively A-theoretic way. The above philosophical positions are premised
on the idea that subjects will agree that they experience time passing. If this isn’t
the case—if the general public are revealed to be largely passage-non-experiencers,
for example – then such contemporary philosophical positions will be premised on a
mistake.11
In addition to asking participants what they believe that it means to say that time
passes, we also asked what reasons they take themselves to have for choosing the
meaning that they do. Participants’ answers to this question are of interest not only
in and of themselves, but also because there are different views of the origin of the
belief that time passes in the philosophical literature. On one view, the origin of the
belief is to be located in the content of visual perception (see, e.g., Paul 2010). On
another view, the origin is located in experience more generally (see, e.g., Torrengo
2017). On a further view, the origin of the belief that time passes implies a role for
memory (see, e.g., Deng 2017). On a final view, the origin is located in a subject’s
awareness of their own agency (see, e.g., Ismael 2012). Thus, in the present study
10 This would be compatible with finding that the majority of participants are passage-experiencers, since
we do not claim to reveal the narrow content of participants’ experience. Those participants whom we dub
passage-experiencers might well be people who do not in fact have a metaphysically loaded phenomenology,
but who nonetheless explain their phenomenology to themselves in such a way.
11 We might also suppose that the general public hold diverse views, such that some will be passage-
experiencers, some passage-non-experiencers, and so on. The issue of interest will then be what explains
the differences between the populations.
123
Synthese
(described below), in addition to questions about whether people experience time
passing and about their understanding of what it means to say that time passes, we
also asked people how they arrived at this understanding of what it means to say that
time passes. As we will shortly describe, we also asked participants a small number
of questions about their beliefs about the nature of time itself and some demographic
questions.
2 The current study
In the current study, adults were asked directly to what extent they agreed that they
experience time passing—‘feeling’ and ‘seeing’ time pass—and about the extent
to which they endorse certain beliefs about time. We acknowledge that the term
‘experience’ can be understood in a number of ways (see, e.g., Hinton’s [1973, ch.
1] discussion). The precise nature of participants’ understanding of the appeal to
experience was not our main focus, though it might be usefully investigated more
systematically in future studies. However, we found it worthwhile to explicitly distin-
guish between claims to ‘feel’ and ‘see’ time passing. While we cannot guarantee that
participants are responding with one particular conception of ‘experience’, ‘see’, or
‘feel’ in mind, we predicted greater agreement with the ‘feel’ claim than with ‘see’ for
two reasons. First, ‘feel’ is commonly used in a broader sense than that of perceptual
phenomenology (and while ‘see’ may sometimes be so used, this is plausibly less
common). Second, when ‘feel’ is used to refer to perceptual phenomenology, there
are cases in which we might feel change or passage happening (one’s breathing or
heartbeat, for example) even though we cannot see it happening (when in complete
darkness, for example). Hence, we would expect those who claim to see time passing
to also claim to feel time passing, and we would predict that some participants will
claim to feel, but not see, time passing.12
As discussed previously, whether people report experiencing time passing might
plausibly be related to their conception of what it means to say that time passes. If
participants differ in their understanding of what it means for time to pass this might
plausibly also affect how their experience has to present itself to them in order for them
to believe that they have an experience as of time as passing. In order to investigate
this relationship, we asked participants what they believe that it means to say that time
passes, and we also asked what reasons they take themselves to have for choosing
the meaning that they do. It will take a great deal more than the exploratory work
presented here to gain a full understanding of these relationships, but we take our
study to present an important first step.
How subjects report their own temporal phenomenology may also be associated
with other, independent tacit beliefs about time. These relationships are likely to be
complex and interdependent, and it may be difficult to discern their direction. We can
nevertheless approach some of these relationships in an exploratory way by identify-
ing candidate independent beliefs. Some of these beliefs might concern the relation
between change in the world and people’s temporal experience. For instance, if sub-
12 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the journal for pushing us to be clearer on this point.
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jects believe that if nothing changes then time does not pass, this may reflect a tacit
inference that time’s passage is to be defined in terms of change in the world. Given
the ubiquity of change in the world, we might expect those who make such a claim
also to claim to feel or see time passing. Belief in a force such as fate may also be
associated with reports about temporal phenomenology, where a belief in fate, or reli-
gious beliefs that may for some subjects entail a kind of fatalism, might imply a belief
that the future already exists, such that reality is static and no change in what exists
over time is required—i.e., time does not pass.
If there is variation in participants’ reports about experiencing time passing, such
a discrepancy might arise from various differences between individuals. We therefore
also asked about demographic factors such as age (assuming that with age we accu-
mulate a greater number of episodic memories, and that this may influence a person’s
beliefs about the passage of time); education (which might increase the awareness that
one’s experiences are not always veridical); and media or print exposure to scientists’
views about the nature of time.
2.1 Method
Ethical approval for this study was received from the research ethics committee of the
second author’s institution.
2.1.1 Participants
Data collection took place both online using the Qualtrics platform and in person using
paper questionnaires. Participants who took part online were recruited from the Prolific
online subject pool (Peer et al. 2017) and a subject pool for undergraduate psychology
students at the second author’s institution. Paper questionnaires were completed at a
series of research outreach events for the general public. Two hundred and twenty-
five people participated online (M  29.51 years, SD  10.44, range: 18–67 years,
89 males), and 204 people participated at the outreach events (M  37.82 years, SD
 16.53, range: 18–84 years, 85 males). Four participants who took part at outreach
events did not report their age, and five participants who took part at outreach events did
not report their gender. The full sample thus comprised 429 adults (M  33.42 years,
SD  14.25, range: 18–84 years, 174 males). Potential participants approached via
the Prolific subject pool all stated that they were fluent in English when registering
with the pool and confirmed this when beginning the questionnaire.
2.1.2 Materials
Participants who were part of the Prolific subject pool or the undergraduate subject
pool completed the questionnaire on desktop, laptop, or mobile devices. Participants
who responded at outreach events completed the questionnaire on paper. Participants
who were part of the Prolific subject pool each received compensation of £1.33 UK
pounds. Those who were part of the undergraduate subject pool received course credit.
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2.1.3 Design and procedure
The study comprised of four Temporal Phenomenology statements, two Meaning of
Temporal Passage questions, five Beliefs Related to Time statements, and three Demo-
graphics questions. All participants first provided informed consent, and then their age
and gender. Participants who completed the questionnaire online answered the Mean-
ing of Temporal Passage question first and then rated their level of agreement with
the Temporal Phenomenology Statements before responding to the Beliefs Related to
Time statements, and finally the Demographics questions. Participants who completed
the questionnaire on paper responded to the Temporal Phenomenology statements prior
to responding to the Meaning of Temporal Passage question, advanced to the Beliefs
Related to Time statements, and finally completed the Demographics questions. Par-
ticipants were randomly allocated to one of four conditions, each of which presented
the questions within the Temporal Phenomenology and Beliefs Related to Time sec-
tions in a different quasi-randomized order. Online participants were not able to skip
any questions; a small number of participants who completed the questionnaire on
paper skipped some questions, yielding slightly different ns across questions for the
analyses below.
2.1.4 Temporal phenomenology statements
Participants saw a scale running from 0 to 100, where 100 represented ‘completely
agree’ and 0 represented ‘completely disagree’. A red dot was situated at the midpoint
of the scale (50). The accompanying text asked participants to move the dot along
a sliding scale (online completion) or mark a point on the scale (paper completion)
to indicate the number that best reflected how much they agreed or disagreed with
a statement. As online participants moved the dot, they saw a number reflecting its
current location on the scale. Participants were also informed of a ‘Don’t Know’
option.
Four Temporal Phenomenology statements were presented. Participants who com-
pleted the questionnaire online also responded to an additional initial practice
statement (Fig. 1), ‘Ripe bananas are delicious’, which was always presented first.
When online participants moved the slider in response to the practice statement, they
received feedback based on the number they chose (0–25, ‘This means you dislike
ripe bananas’; 25–49, ‘This means you don’t like ripe bananas all that much’; 50–74,
‘This means you quite like ripe bananas’; 75–100, ‘This means you really like ripe
bananas’). If online participants selected the ‘Don’t Know’ option in response to the
practice statement, they then answered an additional question: ‘Which is closer to what
you were thinking when you selected this option?’ Three statements were presented,
from which participants were required to choose one: ‘I don’t personally know to what
extent the statement is true or untrue’, ‘I don’t think it is possible to know to what
extent the statement is true or untrue’, and ‘I don’t understand the question’. After
choosing one of these statements, online participants saw the statement ‘When you
choose ‘Don’t Know’, you will always be given the three options that you just saw’
followed by a reiteration of the three options. Participants who completed a question-
naire on paper did not receive a practice question, since marking a point on a line
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Fig. 1 Practice statement, Temporal Phenomenology
was likely to be a more familiar task than moving an online slider. Participants who
received questionnaires on paper could also select a ‘Don’t Know’ option followed by
the same three ‘Don’t Know’ alternatives printed underneath each question.
Participants then read a number of statements describing potential features of one’s
temporal phenomenology and were asked to move the slider (online) or mark a point
(on paper) to indicate how much they agreed with each statement. Two phenomeno-
logical claims were offered. Each was presented twice, once in the positive (‘I feel
time passing’ and ‘I see time passing’) and once in the negative (‘I do not feel time
passing’ and ‘I do not see time passing’), yielding four statements in total (Table 2).
2.1.5 Beliefs Related to Time statements
Participants saw five statements describing certain beliefs about time. Two of these
statements (‘Humans perceive every aspect of time’ and ‘Our experience of time tells
us something about time that science can’t’) are not discussed here as they are not the
focus of the current study. The remaining three statements are presented in Table 2.
Participants again moved a dot along a sliding scale (online) or marked a point on
the scale (paper) to indicate the number that best reflected how much they agreed
or disagreed with a statement. Two of these statements formed a pair, one phrased
positively and one phrased negatively (e.g., ‘Time passes even if nothing changes’ and
‘If nothing changes, time does not pass’) as a check on comprehensibility.
2.1.6 Meaning of Temporal Passage question and reasons
Participants were presented with four statements and asked to rank them according
to how well they described what it means for time to pass, starting with 1 (best
describes what it means for time to pass), then 2 (the next best statement), and so
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on (Fig. 2). Participants were presented with two statements that were putatively A-
theoretic (‘Things move from the future to the present to the past’ and ‘What time is
now changes’) and two statements that were consistent with the B-theory (‘One thing
happens at one time, another thing happens at another time’ and ‘Different things
happen at different times’). Participants were then presented with five possible reasons
for thinking that their top-ranked statement was the best way to describe what it means
for time to pass (Fig. 3), the last of which was ‘Other’, and selected as many reasons
as applied. If ‘Other’ was among the options chosen, the participant was invited to
state their reason by typing a response into a free text box.
2.1.7 Demographics questions
At the conclusion of the questionnaire participants were asked about the level of their
highest qualification on a 9-point scale (according to levels of qualifications obtainable
in the UK and in Ireland), how often within the last three years they were exposed to
information in the media or in print about the scientific study of time (never; once;
two or three times; more than two or three times), and whether or not they believe in
a God (no, not sure, or yes).
2.1.8 Data scoring and analysis
Participants’ responses on negatively worded statements were reverse-scored by sub-
tracting the value of each response from 100. For the purposes of analysis and
classification of participants (see below), dichotomized scores were calculated for
Temporal Phenomenology statements by categorizing values over 50 as agreement
with the statement, values below 50 as disagreement with the statement, and values of
50 (the midpoint) as missing. Pairs of positively and negatively worded statements
demonstrated acceptable, but not excellent reliability (Spearman-Brown split-half
coefficients between .707 and .794). For this reason, we did not collapse responses
to pairs of positively and negatively worded statements prior to analysis. Given the
complexity of the domain and the possibility that participants were reflecting on their
own beliefs related to time and temporal phenomenology for the first time, the fact
that reliability ratings are moderate rather than high is perhaps unsurprising.
2.2 Results
Means, 95% confidence intervals, and reliability between pairs of positively and neg-
atively worded Temporal Phenomenology and Beliefs Related to Time statements are
reported in Table 2. ‘Don’t Know’ responses were excluded from analyses, yielding
slightly different ns for the analyses below. Across Temporal Phenomenology and
Beliefs Related to Time statements, the number of participants who chose any one of
the three Don’t Know options ranged from 0 (0%) to 25 (5.87%). Very few partici-
pants stated that they did not understand the question (range: 0 (0%) to 8 (2.05%)).
Responses to the Meaning of Temporal Passage question are presented in Fig. 2.
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First, we checked whether the order in which participants completed the ques-
tionnaire (i.e., Temporal Phenomenology statements preceding or following Meaning
of Temporal Passage statements) had an impact on responding. There was no sig-
nificant order effect on participants’ responses to the Temporal Phenomenology
statements, regardless of whether the question was phrased positively or negatively
(all ps > .110).
2.2.1 Temporal Phenomenology Statements
We next examined participants’ responses to the Temporal Phenomenology state-
ments. The modal score was 100 for both positively worded statements and 0 for both
negatively worded statements, indicating that the most common response to the posi-
tively worded statements was complete agreement and the most common response to
the negatively worded statements was complete disagreement. Wilcoxon signed-ranks
tests revealed that participants agreed significantly more strongly that they feel time
passing than that they see time passing, both for positively worded statements (z  −
4.13, p< .001) and negatively worded statements (z=− 3.41, p < .001).
On the basis of dichotomized responses, 83% of participants indicated agreement
with the statement ‘I feel time passing’ (that is, gave a response that was equal to
or above 51), and 78% indicated agreement with the statement ‘I see time passing’.
Seventy-eight percent of participants indicated disagreement with the statement ‘I do
not feel time passing’, and 73% indicated disagreement with the statement ‘I do not
see time passing’. Dichotomized responses for positive and negative question pairs
were largely consistent with one another: 84.1% of participants were consistent across
the ‘feel time pass’ pair and 82.7% were consistent across the ‘see time pass’ pair.
For positively worded questions a small minority claimed to see, but not to feel time
passing (n 26; 6.8%) and a slightly larger minority claimed to feel, but not to see
time passing (n 45; 11.8%). A McNemar test demonstrated that the proportion of
participants who claimed to see, but not to feel time pass when answering positively
worded questions was significantly lower than the proportion who claimed not to see,
but to feel time passing (p  .032). For negatively worded questions, similar results
were apparent: a small minority of participants claimed that they do not see, but do feel
time passing (n 51; 13.18%), and this was significantly higher than the proportion
of participants who claimed that they do see, but do not feel time passing (n 26;
6.72%, p  .006).
Thus, the majority of participants believed themselves both to feel and to see time
passing. Participants believed more strongly that they feel time passing than that they
see time passing; as we expected ‘feel’ to be understood as a broader experiential
notion, this result is as we predicted. Nonetheless, the most common response both in
the case of claiming to see and to feel time passing was complete agreement that this
was the case.
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Table 2 Extent of agreement with Temporal Phenomenology and Beliefs Related to Time statements
Statement n M (SD) Min Max 95% CI Reliability
(Spearman-Brown
split-half)
Temporal phenomenology
I feel time passing 418 71.53 (25.63) 0 100 69.07, 74.00 .769
I do not feel time
passinga
420 27.00 (26.75) 0 100 24.44, 29.57
I see time passing 415 66.99 (28.18) 0 100 64.27, 69.70 .794
I do not see time
passinga
417 32.24 (29.76) 0 100 29.38, 35.10
Beliefs related to time
Time passes even if
nothing changes
417 81.04 (27.72) 0 100 78.37, 83.70 .707
If nothing changes,
time does not passa
412 15.82 (25.33) 0 100 13.37, 18.28
There is such a
thing as fate,
destiny, or karma
401 46.35 (34.37) 0 100 42.98, 49.73
aWhile responses to the statements ‘I feel time passing’ and ‘I see time passing’ were reverse-scored for
the purposes of analyses, original response values are presented here
2.2.2 Meaning of temporal passage questions
Next, we examined participants’ responses to the Meaning of Temporal Passage ques-
tion and the reasons that they gave for their answer. Recall that participants ranked
four statements according to how well they described what it means for time to pass
on a scale of 1–4 (where 1 represented the top rank and 4 the lowest rank) and then
selected as many reasons for their choice as were applicable. Figure 2 presents the
ranks assigned by participants to each Meaning of Temporal Passage statement, and
Fig. 3 stratifies endorsement of reasons by top-ranked statement.
It can be seen from Fig. 2 that the two putatively A-theoretic statements received
higher rankings than the two statements that are consistent with the B-theory. A Fried-
man test indicated significant differences between the ranks assigned by participants
to statements (χ2 (1)  171.39, p< .001). Dunn-Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed sta-
tistically significant differences in ranked position between every pair of statements,
with the exception of the two statements consistent with a B-series conception of time.
Thus, the A-theoretic statement ‘Things move from being in the future to being in the
present to being in the past’ was ranked significantly higher than the A-theoretic state-
ment ‘What time is now changes’. Both of these A-theoretic statements were ranked
significantly higher than either of the two statements that were also consistent with
the B-theory (‘Different things happen at different times’ and ‘One thing happens at
one time, another thing happens at another time’).
When asked to select one or more reasons for their choice of top-ranked statement,
more than half of participants endorsed ‘Because I experience things this way’ and
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54.4%
23.4% 13.9% 9.3%
18.9%
40.8%
18.3% 22.2%
9.4%
17.1%
41.5%
31.5%
17.3% 18.6% 26.3%
36.9%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Things move from being in
the future to being in the
present to being in the past
(n = 417)
What me is 'now' changes
(n = 414)
Different things happen at
different mes (n = 410)
One thing happens at one
me, another thing happens
at another me (n = 409)
First Second Third Fourth
Fig. 2 Ranks assigned by participants to each meaning of temporal passage statement
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
One thing happens at one me, another
thing happens at another me (n = 39 )
Different things happen at different
mes (n = 56)
What me is 'now' changes (n = 98)
Things move from being in the future to
being in the present to being in the past
(n = 226)
Proporon of parcipants (within top-ranked statement)
Top-ranked statement
Things that can be altered at one me
become fixed at another me
See things changing over me
Can compare what's happening now
with what I remember
Experience things this way
Other
Fig. 3 Proportion of participants endorsing one or more reasons for choosing their top-ranked statement, by
top-ranked statement
‘Because I see things changing over time’. Over 40% endorsed ‘Because I can compare
what’s happening now with what I can remember’, over 20% endorsed ‘Because things
that can be altered at one time become fixed at a later time’, and 7.5% provided their
own reason. A series of chi-square tests on the four specific reasons presented to
participants indicated that whether a subject endorsed one of these reasons did not
differ as a function of the first-ranked statement that the reasons were intended to
explain (all ps > .277). The overall pattern of results was largely consistent across
first-ranked statements (Fig. 3). Thus, regardless of whether participants first-ranked
an interpretation of what it means for time to pass that was more distinctively A-
theoretic or one that was also consistent with the B-theory, they tended to explain their
interpretation in terms of their experience, in terms of seeing change, and, to a lesser
extent, in terms of memory.
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2.2.3 Classification of participants
We proceeded to classify participants on the basis of their responses to both Tempo-
ral Phenomenology and Meaning of Temporal Passage statements (n 358; Fig. 4).
Responses to ‘seeing time pass’ paired questions and ‘feeling time pass’ paired ques-
tions were initially considered separately. Participants were coded as seeing time pass
if they endorsed the ‘I see time passing’ statement (score 51–100) and rejected ‘I do not
see time passing’ (score 0–49). The same coding was applied to the ‘feeling time pass’
question pair. Among participants who were consistent across positive and negative
question pairs, 87.5% were coded as feeling time pass and 80.7% as seeing time pass.
Participants were subsequently classified according to the system given in Table 1. The
percentage of participants who were classified in each category is shown in Fig. 4. The
plot also shows the distributions of participants’ scores for the positively worded state-
ments ‘I feel time passing’ and ‘I see time passing’ (for simplicity, negatively worded
responses are not plotted). From the figure, it can be seen that the modal response
for passage- and change-experiencers to these statements was 100, whereas there was
no clear modal response for passage- or change-non-experiencers. A chi-square test
indicated that there was no statistical association between being an experiencer and
selecting an A- or B-theoretic Meaning of Temporal Passage statement (χ2  .13, p
.72).
2.2.4 Beliefs related to time statements and demographics questions
Finally, we conducted exploratory analyses to compare the responses of experiencers
and non-experiencers, and of participants who endorsed distinctively A-theoretic and
B-theory-consistent Meaning of Temporal Passage statements, to Beliefs Related to
Time statements and Demographics questions. We were unable to compare responses
to these questions across all four groups into which we had classified participants
(passage-experiencers, change-experiencers, passage-non-experiencers, change-non-
experiencers) due to loss of statistical power and empty cells resulting from the small
number of participants in the change-non-experiencer group.
We began by comparing participants who endorsed distinctively A-theoretic Mean-
ing of Temporal Passage statements to those who chose versions of these statements
also compatible with the B-theory, regardless of their claims about their temporal
experience. A Welch’s independent t test demonstrated that participants who endorsed
A-theoretic statements (M 5.81, SD  1.56) were better-educated than those who
endorsed statements compatible with the B-theory (M 5.36, SD  2.03; t (128.73) 
2.01, 95% CI [.01, .90], p .046). No other comparisons were statistically significant
(all ps > .376).
We then compared experiencers (participants who claimed to experience time pass-
ing: that is, those who were coded as either ‘feeling time pass’ or ‘seeing time pass’)
and non-experiencers (that is, those who were coded as neither feeling nor seeing
time pass), regardless of their choice of Meaning of Temporal Passage statement. A
chi-square test demonstrated that experiencers were more likely to be educated to a
standard at or above high-school leaving (examinations at the age of approximately 18)
than non-experiencers, p  .02. However, the presence of only 24 non-experiencers in
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A-experiencer (n = 261; 72.9%)
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
tim
e 
pa
ss
in
g
B-experiencer (n = 73; 20.4%)
Feel time passing See time passing
M = 78.41, SD = 19.63 M = 72.97, SD = 23.94 
Feel time passing See time passing
M = 22.28, SD = 12.84 M = 19.89, SD = 11.86
Feel time passing See time passing
M = 80.27, SD = 15.11 M = 74.85, SD = 24.96
Feel time passing See time passing
M = 26.67, SD = 15.21 M = 20.17, SD = 14.54
A-non-experiencer (n = 18; 5.0%)
B-non-experiencer (n = 6; 1.7%)
Fig. 4 Distributions, means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals for Temporal Phenomenology
statements, by group. Being an A- or B-experiencer requires scoring either ‘I feel time passing’ or ‘I see
time passing’ at or above 51, but not necessarily scoring both statements at or above 51. Some A- and
B-experiencers therefore score at or below 49 for one of the two statements
the sample renders this conclusion tentative. No other comparisons were statistically
significant (all ps > .079).
3 Discussion
We explored participants’ beliefs regarding the purported experience as of time pass-
ing, their conception of temporal passage, and relations between them. We also asked
how these experiences and beliefs may be informed by independent beliefs about time,
as well as being associated with demographic factors.
Before distinguishing between participants’ understandings of what it means to
say that ‘time passes’, it is notable that a substantial majority of participants described
themselves as having a phenomenology as of time passing, manifesting both as feeling
and seeing time passing. The most common response to the statements ‘I feel time
passing’ and ‘I see time passing’ was complete agreement, regardless of whether the
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statements were expressed positively or negatively. A minority of participants gave
responses that indicated disagreement with either or both of these statements. It could
be that the existence of this minority indicates that there genuinely are differences
across individuals’ experiences of time passing. Alternatively, these participants may
have understood the question(s) in a different way than other participants, which,
given that we did not provide any further guide to participants as to how to interpret
the question, remains possible. Participants were somewhat more likely to agree with
the statement that they felt time passing than that they saw time passing, in line with
the idea that ‘feel’ is interpreted more broadly than ‘see’. Nevertheless, there were
a small number of participants who reported seeing, but not feeling the passage of
time. This might signal that these participants did not understand ‘feel’ to be a broad
experiential notion that includes ‘see’ (for example, they may have only interpreted
‘feel’ in terms of tactile sensations). Alternatively, it might signal that while these
participants claim to see time passing, they do not take ‘time passing’ to show up
anywhere else in experience, and so thought it inappropriate to also agree with the
‘feel’ claim.
We previously indicated that subjects’ understanding of what it means to say that
time passes might seem to reflect either a putatively A-theoretic conception, or a
tacit conception that is also compatible with the B-theory. (Recall that our results
do not reveal whether or not participants’ phenomenology is metaphysically loaded,
but whether or not participants describe their phenomenology in a way that implies
that it is metaphysically loaded.) Our results suggest the former. A large majority of
participants indicated that the best way to describe what it means for time to pass was
a statement describing movement through time or a changing present. Furthermore,
when asked to select one or more reasons for their choice, participants tended to appeal
to experience and to perceived change rather than to the persistence of things through
time in memory, and rarely appealed to the fixed nature of the past. Our results suggest
that people tend to claim to have a phenomenology as of temporal passage and that
this is most often construed as a process of movement through time or a changing
present. Our results also provide evidence that people represent these construals as a
function of subjective experiences rather than as a function of memory or of agency.
However, we did not find evidence that the extent to which participants claimed to feel
and to see time passing was related to their conception of temporal passage.
Of particular relevance to the A-theorists’ argument from experience are the
weightings of passage-experiencers and passage-non-experiencers. Recall that the first
premise of the argument from experience (as presented in §1) states that almost all
subjects would agree that they experience time passing. We put this in terms of the
idea that people are, by and large, passage-experiencers: that they do take themselves
to experience time passing, and that they do understand talk of ‘time passing’ in a
way that is distinctively A-theoretic in nature. Our results reveal that 72.9% of partici-
pants can be classed as passage-experiencers. Those participants who also understand
talk of time passing in a distinctively A-theoretic sense and yet disagreed with the
statements ‘I feel time passing’ and ‘I see time passing’ were classified as ‘passage-
non-experiencers’, and made up only 5% of participants. This may be a greater minority
than the A-theorists using the argument from experience would have predicted, but
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the majority group is nonetheless the passage-experiencers, as those theorists would
have predicted.
We found some evidence that certain independent factors may be associated
with participants’ claims to feel and see time passing, and with their endorse-
ment of A-theoretic definitions of time’s passage or definitions compatible with the
B-theory. Participants who endorsed the distinctively A-theoretic definitions were
better-educated than those who endorsed those compatible with the B-theory. This
might appear counterintuitive, given that the latter statements are typically thought to
align better than A-theoretic statements with the views of contemporary physicists.
One possible explanation is that the more educated participants were more likely
to recognize and attend to the differences in meaning between the distinctively A-
theoretic and B-theory compatible statements, making it less likely that they chose
statements at random. Another possibility is that education tends to encourage people
to reflect on their beliefs, and that the more people engage in this kind of reflection,
the more likely they are to notice that they tend to think and speak of time as passing
or flowing. Thus, the more likely such participants are to have some understanding
of the differences between the definitions, the more likely they are to appeal to the
distinctively A-theoretic definitions that align with the ways in which they think and
talk about time. There was also some evidence that experiencers were better-educated
than non-experiencers. Again, it may be that better-educated participants more readily
reflect on their experience of time, where this may make them more likely to conclude
that they have an experience as of time passing.
There are interesting parallels between our results and those of Latham et al. (2019).
Using a very different procedure, in which participants had to choose a description of a
universe that most resembled our universe, these authors found that a majority (~ 70%)
of participants appeared to hold views of time as dynamical, but they also found a sub-
stantial minority (~ 30%) who appeared to hold a view of time as non-dynamical. Our
results reveal a similar pattern, in that over three-quarters of participants first-ranked
an A-theory-like description of what it means for time to pass (either ‘Things move
from being in the future to being in the present to being in the past’, or ‘What time
is ‘now’ changes’). Note, though, that the aim of Latham et al.’s (2019) study was to
directly examine people’s metaphysical beliefs about time, which they did by means
of providing contrasting (and in fact quite technical) descriptions of universes with dif-
ferent temporal properties. In our study, we did not ask people whether they believed
that time was dynamic or not. Rather, we asked them about their understanding of
what it means to say that time passes; this was because we could only confidently
classify participants as passage-experiencers if they both (i) claimed to experience
time as passing, and (ii) understood ‘time passing’ in a distinctively A-theoretic way.
Nevertheless, despite the differing aims of the studies, the similarity in our findings
with those of Latham et al. suggest that it is very possible that our participants’ def-
inition of what it means to talk about time as passing also reflects their underlying
beliefs about the nature of time itself.
In recent work published after the current study was conducted, Latham et al. (forth-
coming) also empirically investigated whether people report having a phenomenology
as of time passing, where—if they do—this might be construed as providing prima
facie support for an argument from experience in support of the claim that time does
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pass. We now consider how our findings compare with theirs. First, the overall per-
centage of our participants who agreed that they felt or saw time passing is broadly
similar to the average percentage of participants in their study who agreed with state-
ments about experiencing time in a dynamic way. As we will discuss below, Latham
et al. asked a much larger set of questions about temporal experience, but typically
participants agreed with positive statements about experiencing time’s passage around
70–85% of the time. Thus, both studies suggest that the majority of people agree that
they have some type of experience of time as passing. Where the findings of the studies
seem to diverge is in (a) the nature of participants’ responses to the parallel negative
statements about temporal experience and (b) the strength of participants’ agreement
with statements regarding experiences about the passage of time. These differences
require consideration because of their implications for the interpretation of the two
sets of findings.
With regard to (a), the proportion of participants in our study who disagreed with
negative statements about experiencing time’s passage was very similar to the pro-
portion who agreed with positive statements, and participants’ responses to positive
and negative statements were generally consistent (over 80% of the time). By con-
trast, Latham et al. found participants were significantly less likely to disagree with
a negative statement than to agree with a positive one. Moreover, there was much
less consistent responding across positive and negative statements, and correlations
between responses to positive and the equivalent negative statements were either weak
or non-significant. Lack of perfect consistency in responses to negatively and positively
worded (but otherwise identical) statements is very common in questionnaire-based
research (e.g., Barnette 2000; Chang 1995), and, as Latham et al. point out, may be, at
least to some extent, explicable in terms of an acquiescence bias—a tendency to agree
to statements regardless of their content. However, it may also reflect participants’
difficulties with understanding or consistently interpreting a statement, and there is
long-standing evidence that suggests that participants struggle in particular with neg-
atively worded statements (e.g., Johnson et al. 2004; Van Sonderen et al. 2013). The
particularly low levels of correlations between negative and positive statements in the
Latham et al. study raise the issue of the extent to which participants were confident
or reliable in their interpretations of the statements.
In fact, Latham et al. (forthcoming) draw an important inference from the difference
between responses to their positively worded and negatively worded statements: they
suggest that it supports what they term the ‘ambiguity hypothesis’. The idea is that
“there is ambiguity either in the content or character of the phenomenology, or in
what its character tells us about the world”. They argue that because of this ambiguity,
participants’ responses to statements are heavily shaped by the framing of a statement
(positive or negative). Moreover, Latham et al. provide the same interpretation of why
they find levels of agreement to statements of both kinds to be weak: participants only
weakly agree with statements because of this ambiguity. In arguing that their results
support some version of the ambiguity hypothesis, they then conclude “that there is no
overwhelming need for philosophers of time to attempt to accommodate the presence
of some unambiguous, and strongly felt, phenomenology as of time passing”.
Indeed, with regard to (b), it was the case that, on average, their participants only
weakly agreed that it seems as though time passes (and Latham et al. did not find the
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predicted relationship between reported phenomenology of time passing and endorse-
ment of a theory of time entailing that time actually passes). For almost all statements
(both positive and negative) the modal (i.e., most frequent) responses in Latham et al.’s
study were at the midpoint of their scale (i.e., 4 on a 7-point scale). By contrast, our
modal responses were complete agreement with statements indicating that participants
experience time as passing (that is, 100 on our 1–100 scale). How can this discrepancy
between the findings of the two studies be explained, and do our findings cast doubt
on the ambiguity hypothesis as described by Latham et al.?
We note a number of plausible explanations for this discrepancy between our find-
ings and those of Latham et al., two of which concern the particular statements used in
Latham et al.’s study. One is that part of Latham et al.’s specific interest was in studying
participants’ responses to both moving-ego and moving-time statements (whereas we
only appealed to feeling/seeing time passing). Some participants may thus have noticed
that many of the statements represented one or the other mode of expression, and may
have come to the conclusion that they were expected to demonstrate a preference for
one or the other. While Latham et al. found that levels of agreement with moving time
and moving ego statements were positively correlated, such an assumption on the part
of participants may have led to greater uncertainty and so weaker agreement with both
than would have been the case had participants been faced with either type of state-
ment in isolation. A related explanation is that some of Latham et al.’s descriptions
have a more overtly metaphorical flavor (for instance, “it feels like time is whizzing
towards me” and “It feels like time is a moving river that I am floating upon.”). It
seems plausible that people may be cautious about expressing complete agreement
with something that is clearly a metaphor (and indeed a metaphor that carries implica-
tions about the speed of time’s passage), and we note that the mean agreement given to
the overtly metaphorical statements of Latham et al. is somewhat lower than that given
to other statements. Further, the presence of such overtly metaphorical statements may
also have had the effect of highlighting (what the B-theorist would maintain is) the
ultimately metaphorical nature of the remaining A-theoretic statements about time
passing. Finally, and more prosaically, the two studies used different ways to measure
agreement: we used 0–100 scales with only the end and mid-points marked whereas
Latham et al. used a more restricted 7-point Likert scale. All of these differences may
have contributed to the strikingly weaker agreement with claims to experience time
passing reported by Latham et al. compared to the levels of agreement reported in the
current study.
The important issue, then, is whether we wish to argue that our results suggest
Latham et al.’s (forthcoming) ambiguity hypothesis is incorrect. It seems to us plau-
sible that people do indeed—as we report in our study—typically have, or believe
themselves to have, experiences of time as passing. Nevertheless, the nature or con-
tent of the phenomenology might be such that it is extremely difficult to give a rich
verbal description of it, such that it can only be partially captured in metaphorical
terms. One way to put this point is to say that the phenomenology itself may not
be ambiguous, but any verbal description attempting to capture it is likely to prove
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ambiguous.13 Further studies could try to examine this phenomenology in more detail,
perhaps by allowing open-ended rather than forced-choice questions, and also try to
pinpoint the exact explanation of why our findings differ from those of Latham et al.
As things stand, we are inclined to conclude that participants do, by and large, take
themselves to experience time as passing.
Given the claim that there is an argument from experience in support of the A-theory,
it might be argued that the majority of subjects arrive at an A-theoretic conception of
temporal passage as a result of experiencing (either feeling or seeing) time passing. We
cannot, in the present study, provide any evidence for the direction of the relationship
between participants reporting that time seems to pass and the participants having an A-
theoretic conception of time’s passage. It is also worth noting that Latham et al. found
no relationship between reported phenomenology of time passing and endorsement
of a theory of time entailing that time actually passes, although their line of enquiry
differed somewhat from our own focus on interpretations of what it means to say
that time passes. Related future research might seek to examine the causal relations
between the two.14
Our findings do demonstrate that participants tend to favour the distinctively A-
theoretic characterizations of ‘time passing’. To this extent, there is support for the
A-theorist employing the argument from experience, but the first premise of the A-
theorists’ argument from experience has not been shown to be beyond reproach. That
5% of participants are passage-non-experiencers—in addition to 22.1% of participants
favoring conceptions of time passing not necessarily implying a commitment to the
A-theory—may give the A-theorist appealing to people’s everyday intuitions about
time (and their experience of time) pause for thought. Even in our study, there appears
to be a greater distribution of folk intuitions about time passing, and whether or not
time passing is experienced, than the A-theorist is often cast as predicting. Yet, as
the A-theorist predicts, the majority of participants (72.9%) are passage-experiencers,
which is to say both that they understand talk of time passing in a metaphysically
loaded A-theoretic sense and that they claim to experience time passing.
It could be argued that placing such an emphasis on people’s testimony is naïve; it
would, among other things, assume that people are suitably situated to give voice to
the phenomenal character of their experience. We grant that, given our results, it is still
possible that some participants do (or do not) experience time as passing, even if they
do not believe that this is the case. The Phenomenal Illusionist’s and the Cognitive
Error Theorist’s responses to the second premise in the A-theorists’ argument from
experience are compatible with our results.
4 Conclusion
Our discussion is pitched in the context of debates regarding whether or not our experi-
ence of time supports one metaphysical view of time over another. In the philosophical
13 This would be in line with the philosophical literature on the difficulty of arriving at a coherent conception
of what it would be for time to pass (McTaggart 1908; Price 2011). See also Skow (2011), especially on
descriptions of alleged experiences of time’s passage.
14 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the journal for pushing us to be clearer on this point.
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literature it is currently a debated issue as to whether time does seem to pass. That is,
there are disagreements over how to characterise the phenomenology; consequently
there are disagreements about what the apparent ingredients of the phenomenology
are for the A-theorist and B-theorist to appeal to, or to explain away, in an effort to
gain a dialectical advantage.
On the basis of our results (discussed in §2), we conclude that people tend to claim
to have a phenomenology as of temporal passage, most often construed as a process
of movement through time or a change in the time that is ‘now’. Our results also
provide evidence that people take the passage of time to be a function of subjective
experiences. In the wider debate, our results could be interpreted as providing some
defeasible support for the first premise in the A-theorist’s argument from experience.
At least, it would appear that for a majority of subjects, it is not only part of the naïve
view of time that time is the sort of thing that passes, but there is also a widely endorsed
(perhaps tacit) belief that some metaphysically loaded ingredient of the phenomenal
character of experience can be picked out as time seeming to pass. However, we also
recommended caution in drawing the conclusion that subjects do in fact experience
time as passing. Strictly speaking, our data only show that participants claim to have
a phenomenology of temporal passage, rather than conclusively showing that they do
have such a phenomenology.
While our discussion has focused upon how subjects report their experience, it
is to be granted that not all A-theorists are motivated by an appeal to experience.
Some theorists have argued that the A-theory is the best articulation of our common-
sense commitments about time and persistence, rather than being straightforwardly
supported by reflection on experience. In future research we aim to investigate subjects’
beliefs about time more directly, rather than beliefs about their temporal experience.
The hope is that such research may begin to reveal something about what those belief
structures actually are—i.e. what naïve view of time, if any, subjects in fact operate
with in their day-to-day lives—and how such beliefs about time arise.
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